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Abstract
In this paper we examine the effect of a pilot project of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency, where in 14 German local employment offices the caseload (number of
unemployed per caseworker) was significantly reduced. Since the participating local offices
were not chosen at random, we have to take into account potential selection bias. Therefore,
we rely on a combination of matching and a difference-in-differences estimator. We use
two indicators of the offices’ success (unemployment rate, growth of the number of SC-
III clients). Our results indicate a positive effect of a lower caseload on both outcome
variables.
Zusammenfassung
Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit hat im Mai 2007 ein Pilotprojekt gestartet, bei dem in 14
Dienststellen der Betreuungssschlüssel (Zahl der Arbeitslosen pro Vermittler) deutlich re-
duziert wurde. Da die teilnehmenden Dienststellen nicht zufällig ausgewählt wurden, ist bei
der Evaluation eine mögliche Selektionsverzerrung zu berücksichtigen. Aus diesem Grund
verwenden wir eine Kombination aus Matching und Differenz-in-Differenzen-Schätzansatz.
Als Indikatoren für den Erfolg des Modellprojekts wird die Arbeitslosenquote und die Ver-
änderung der SGB III-Kundenzahl herangezogen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich
der verbesserte Betreuungsschlüssel auf beide Erfolgsgrößen positiv auswirkt.
JEL classification: J68, H43, C14
Keywords: Evaluation, Genetic Matching, Labour Market Policy, Caseload
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Stefan Fuchs, Alfred Garloff, Stefan Theuer,
Frank Sowa and Cordula Zabel for helpful comments and discussions and to the SU
III 1 unit as well as the BA-SH unit of the German Public Employment Service.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades there was a large interest in empirical studies evaluating the causal
effects of active labour market policy (ALMP) (for an overview see Kluve (2006)). Most of
these studies focus on the effect of programmes like training, employment subsidies, start-
up assistance or job creation schemes. However, active labour market policy also includes
employment services. The main task of employment services is to match vacant jobs with
job seekers. A crucial aspect mentioned by political decision makers in this context is the
caseload which specifies the number of job seekers who are assigned to one caseworker.
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between caseload and the performance of
an employment office is sparse and results are mixed: For Germany, Schiel et al. (2006)
find evidence for positive effects of a lower caseload on the future employment chances
of job seekers. On the other hand Froelich et al. (2007) find no significant effects of the
caseload for job seekers in Switzerland. For welfare recipients in the United States Hill
(2006) even reports negative significant effects of a lower caseload.
To see whether caseload actually makes a difference regarding the performance of em-
ployment offices, in 2006 the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für
Arbeit) significantly increased the number of placement officers in a selected set of 14 of
its 779 local employment offices. In participating offices the ratio of officers to unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) benefit recipients was lowered to 1:50 while it remained at roughly
1:100 in the non participating offices. In this paper we evaluate the effects of this increase
on labour market outcomes at the regional level. Specifically, we ask whether the participa-
ting offices improved their performance with respect to reintegrating registered unemployed
and programme participants into the labour market.
The participating local offices were not randomly selected, but chosen by the Federal Em-
ployment Agency. To take into account potential selection bias, we rely on a combination of
matching and a difference-in-differences estimator. The participating offices are matched
to comparable non-participating offices using a large set of covariates that capture the
assignment mechanism. In the matched data we then conduct a difference-in-differences
estimation to control for time-invariant regional characteristics.
We find that the pilot project resulted in an improvement of the performance of the participa-
ting local employment offices. The unemployment rate in the pilot project offices decreased
one percentage point in the first year after programme start. Half of this decrease is due to
the lower caseload. This is robust to additional checks that investigate whether the increase
in the performance of the participating offices is caused by negative spill-over effects on
neighbouring non participating offices. Our results indicate that no such negative spill-over
effects occurred.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, we describe the pilot project in
more detail. Section three explains our empirical strategy. Section four describes the data.
Section five explains the implementation of the matching estimator and presents balance
checks and the findings for the treatment effects. Section six concludes.
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2 Pilot project “Activation of clients and improvement of inte-
gration services”
In 2006 the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) decided to run a pilot project in order
to assess the effectiveness of additional placement officers. The pilot project consisted
of a substantial increase of the number of placement officers in 14 out of 779 local em-
ployment offices chosen in December 2006.1 During January and April 2007 around 400
additional placement officers were hired and trained. The idea was to set a caseload of one
placement officer per 70 unemployment insurance (UI) benefit recipients. However, in the
first months of 2007 there was a significant decrease in unemployment in Germany. Thus,
the factual caseload at the official start of the pilot project (1 May 2007) in the participating
communities was 1:50, while in the other non participating local employment offices the
caseload was on average 1:100.2
The 14 pilot project offices were not randomly drawn out of the pool of local employment
offices, but according to a well documented set of criteria allowing us to accurately capture
the assignment mechanism with our set of covariates. The criteria for selecting the partici-
pating offices were as follows: first, at least one local office had to be chosen from each of
the ten regional directorates (see footnote 1). Second, there was a tendency to chose local
employment offices from regions with better labour market conditions than the regional
average. Third, the local employment offices had to be able to provide the facilities needed
to accommodate the new staff so office space was an important consideration. Finally,
some anecdotal evidence suggests that soft factors (e.g. personal contact) might have
played a role in the decision process as well.
It is important to note that apart from the decrease in the caseload, to our knowledge no
other major changes accompanied the participation in the pilot project, especially, there
was no change in the integration budget. In other words the overall office budget to
implement its employment and training measures aiming at the integration of jobseekers
into the labour market remained constant. Yet, there was one change of conditions for the
pilot project offices, namely a) they had to sign new target agreements and b) a separate
controlling tool was implemented. We consider these changes as part of our treatment.
3 Methods
In order to identify the effect of the pilot project we use the potential outcome framework
(cf. e.g. (Holland, 1986) or (Rubin, 1974)), where the effect of interest is analyzed in
comparison to the counterfactual situation, namely the situation if the treatment group had
1 The FEA is organised in ten regional directorates that consist of 178 employment agencies. Each employ-
ment agency is organised as several local employment offices and one main local employment office, which
differs slightly in terms of its structure as some organisational processes are concentrated here (e.g. human
resources department). In the empirical analysis, we will take this difference into account.
2 Taking registered unemployed who do not receive any benefits into account (e.g. women who want to rejoin
the labour force after long-term maternity leave) the caseload was 1:80 and respectively 1:170 in non-pilot
project local employment offices.
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not have received treatment. Let treat = 1 if the local employment office is a pilot project
office and treat = 0 if it was not chosen to be a pilot project office and y an indicator of its
performance, the outcome of interest. Let y1i be the potential outcome of unit i in case of
treatment and y0i the potential outcome of unit i in case of no treatment. For each unit the
causal effect of the treatment is defined as the difference between its potential outcomes,
only one of which is observed.
We focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ) which is defined as the
difference in the expected outcomes under the treatment and control condition integrated
over the distribution of the treated units:
ATT (x) ≡ E(y1 − y0 | x, treat = 1)
which is identified under the assumption of selection on observables and common support.
The common support assumption is innocuous in our data. The 14 participating offices fall
well within the characteristics of the non-participating offices as measured by our covariates
x.
To adjust for the potential selection bias, we rely on a combination of matching and a
difference-in-differences estimation (DiD-matching, see Heckman/Ichimura/Todd (1998))
that exploits the fact that the outcome variables are observed both in the pre-treatment
period right before the start of the program ybef and in the post-treatment period yaft.
Apart from the observed confounding variables, this design also accommodates the presence
of time-invariant unobserved confounders. The key identifying assumption of the DiD
matching estimator is
E(y0aft − y0bef |x, treat = 1) = E(y0aft − y0bef |x, treat = 0)
meaning that conditional on the observed covariates the before and after differences in
outcome are independent of the treatment assignment (conditional independence assump-
tion (CIA)). In other words, the before and after difference in the outcome of the controls is
equal to the before and after difference in the outcome for the treated had they not been
treated. By taking the differences in the outcomes before and after treatment, we eliminate
time-constant unobserved factors (Smith/Todd (2005)).
The ATTDiD can be estimated as:
ÂTT
DiD
=
1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩CS
(y1aft,i − y0bef,i)− ∑
j∈I0∩CS
w(i, j)(y0aft,j − y0bef,j)

where CS refers to the common support, I0 and I1 the control group and the group of
the pilot project offices, respectively. The number of pilot project offices in the common
support region is denoted by n1 and w(i, j) is the weight of office j if it is matched to the
pilot project office i.
As in most applications x contains several characteristics which makes exact matching
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difficult, matching techniques that are based on a reduction of x to one dimension, e.g.
propensity score matching or mahalanobis distance matching, have been developed in
order to balance the distribution of the covariates in the treatment and the matched control
group. Here we rely on Genetic Matching (GM) as developed by Diamond and Sekhon
(2006). Formally, each treated unit is matched to m = 1, 2, 3 nearest neighbors according
to the following generalized Mahalanobis distance metric d:
d(xi,xj) = {(xi − xj)′(S−1/2)′V S−1/2(xi − xj)}1/2
where V is a (k×k) positive definite weight matrix with zero in all elements except the main
diagonal and S1/2 is the Cholesky decomposition of S, the variance-covariance matrix of
x, the (N × k) matrix of covariate characteristics. Notice that this metric generalizes the
conventional Mahalanobis distance distance metric which we obtain when setting each of
the k parameters in the diagonal of V equal to 1.
In GM, the weights in the diagonal of V are chosen by an evolutionary algorithm such that
covariate balance between the treatment and the control group is maximized (Sekhon/Mebane
(1998)). We define the balance score in the objective function as the lowest p-value
across covariate-by-covariate paired t-tests for differences in means and bootstrapped
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of distributions. Diamond/Sekhon (2006) and
Sekhon (2006) present evidence from Monte Carlo simulations that show the good proper-
ties of this balance score. The key advantage over conventional matching techniques is
that GM often leads to higher levels of covariate balance especially in cases where there
are few treated units where the stochastic balancing of the propensity score may not lead
to satisfactory balance.
Finally, notice that we estimate the treatment effect using regression adjustment (in our
case OLS regression) with a set of key covariates in the matched data-set as recommended
in Abadie and Imbens (2006) and Ho et al. (2007) in order to account for any bias that
may result from the presence of matching discrepancies.
4 Data
4.1 Outcome Variables
The data source for our analysis is the Dataware House (DWH) of the Federal Employment
Agency (FEA), the FEA human resource department and the Federal Statistical Office.
Since we want to estimate the effect of the pilot project on the performance of the pilot
project offices, all our variables are measured at a regional level. The local employment
offices are in charge of the group of so-called Social Code (SC) III clients, who are (mostly)
entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.3 Therefore, our outcome variables focus
on these SC-III clients. They are registered as unemployed or as participants of active
labour market programmes. As indicators of the offices’ success we use the following
3 In contrast, Social Code II clients receive means-tested unemployment benefit II and are typically long-term
unemployed.
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two variables: a) the SC-III unemployment rate and b) the growth of the number of SC-III
clients. As participants of active labour market programmes are not counted as registered
unemployed we use the second indicator to assure that a decrease in the regional un-
employment rate is not caused by an increased programme intensity.
The SC-III unemployment rate is defined as the number of registered SC-III unemployed
relative to the official reference figure, which is the total labour force. Applying DiD-
Matching, we take the difference between this unemployment rate in April 2008 and April
2007:
Y a := unemployment rateSCIIIApril08 - unemployment rate
SCIII
April07
Concerning the second indicator, we use the difference between the percentage growth of
the number of SC-III clients before and after programme start. To avoid potential seasonal
effects we compute each growth rate for twelve months, i.e.:
Y b :=
NSCIII−clientsApril08 −NSCIII−clientsMay07
NSCIII−clientsMay07
− N
SCIII−clients
April07 −NSCIII−clientsMay06
NSCIII−clientsMay06
4.2 Covariates
In addition to the difference-in-differences approach, which accounts for unobservable
time-invariant factors, we use a large number of observable control variables influencing
the selection of the pilot project offices and our outcome variables. In our case we cannot
exactly reproduce the decision process of the FEA. However, since we have a rich adminis-
trative data set at our disposal, we are able to control for many factors that are correlated
to the outcome, which finally makes it plausible that the CIA holds. The variables listed
in table 1 are included in the matching algorithm. Most of the variables are measured at
the local employment office level. Some of them represent the economic performance of
the region or the demand side of the local labour market, like average wages, employ-
ment growth or commuting. Other variables focus on the composition of the SC III-clients,
like age, gender, nationality or qualification and its dynamic. In this context we further
include a typology of SC-III-clients of the FEA regarding their future employment prospects.
Additionally, we account for variables measuring the tightness of the local labour market,
like vacancy rate, unemployment rate and growth of unemployment. Seasonal aspects are
captured by the variable “standard deviation of unemployment rate”. As each local employ-
ment office operates not only on a local labour market but is part of a larger regional labour
market we include regional variables at the employment agency level as well.
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Table 1: Matching variables
Local level: employment growth (2004-2006)
population density per km2 (2005)
average wages (fulltime)
percentage growth of average wages (2000 - 2006)
commuters: Net commuting per employee (place of residence)
commuters: Net commuting per employee (place of work)
vacancy rate (Dec 2006)
percentage growth of stock of unemployed (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
number of SC-III clients (Dec 2006)
share of SC-III benefit recipients of all SC-III clients
mean of unemployment rate (Jan - Dec 2006)
standard deviation of unemployment rate (Jan - Dec 2006)
mean share of training participants (Jan - Dec 2006)
share clients type "activating" (Dec 2006)
share clients type "advancing" (Dec 2006)
share clients type "caring" (Dec 2006)
share clients type "market" (Dec 2006)
share clients type missing (Dec 2006)
share clients above 50 years (Dec 2006)
share clients below 25 years (Dec 2006)
share clients without school degree (Dec 2006)
share clients male (Dec 2006)
share clients German citizenship (Dec 2006)
percentage growth of number of clients above 50 years (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
percentage growth of number of clients below 25 years (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
percentage growth of number of clients without school degree (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
percentage growth of number of clients male (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
percentage growth of number of clients German citizenship (Dec 2005 - Dec 2006)
mean integration rate (Jan - Dec 2006), controlling indicator
mean unemployment duration (Jan - Dec 2006), controlling indicator
mean difference between regional and local unemployment rate (Jan - Dec 2006)
Regional level: employment growth (2004-2006)
mean sanction rate (Jan - Dec 2006)
caseload (Dec 2006)
percentage growth of numbers of vacancies (April 2006 - April 2007)
share of SC-II unemployed of all unemployed (Dec 2006)
mean of unemployment rate (Jan - Dec 2006)
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5 Results
5.1 Implementation
We imposed three matching restrictions: First, since head local employment offices differ
from the other local employment offices (see footnote 1), we matched exactly on the
organisational structure, i.e. a head local employment office could only be matched to
a head local employment office. Analogously regular local employment offices were only
matched to regular local employment offices.
Second, potential spill-over effects might bias the estimation of the effect of interest, the
ATT . In order to exclude potential spill-over effects, we did not use any local employment
office that are located in an employment office district where a pilot project office was
located (“neighbor offices”) as control.4
Third, we excluded a very small set of local employment offices from the pool of potential
controls due to their geographic peculiarity (i.e. islands) or data problems (Borkum, Rügen,
Norderney, Westerland, Juist and Lauterecken).
We are left with a donor pool of potential controls consisting of 549 local employment
offices and of 162 main local employment offices. The results reported in this paper are
based on 1:1-matching as this specification leads to the sample with the best covariates
balance. Additionally, we tested 1:2- and 1:3-matching and the results are virtually identical
and available upon request.
5.2 Matching quality
In order to assess the matching quality, we use three indicators: the standardised difference
(i.e. the difference in means between the two groups scaled by the standard deviation), the
p-values of bootstrapped covariate-by-covariate Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality
of distributions, and the p-values of paired covariate-by-covariate t-tests of mean differences.
All three are informative on covariate differences (mean or distribution) between treatment
and potential control group before and treatment and control group after matching, respect-
ively.
Before matching, there were significant differences in the mean between treated and potential
controls regarding six of the covariates, e.g. the regional employment growth or integra-
tion rate (cf. column 4 table 4). According to the t-tests of mean differences, there are no
significant differences between treated and control group after matching (cf. column 4 table
5). The same is true for differences in the distributions of the covariates. After matching
with the highest p-value at 0.15 there are no significant differences (cf. column 5 table 4 and
column 5 table 5). However, to be sure we conduct an additional regression adjustment on
the matched sample using covariates with p-values less than 0.20 as regressors: Dummy
for eastern Germany, share SC II-unemployed (region), share type “market”.5 To account
for nonlinearities we also include squares and cubes of these three variables and their
interactions.
4 Further below we will use these neighbour offices in order to explicitly analyse potential spill-over effects in
section 5.4.
5 Integration rate and unemployment duration have also p-values less than 0.20, but remaining differences in
the matched sample are already accounted for in the difference-in-differences strategy.
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5.3 Treatment effects
In this section the results of the estimation of the effect of the pilot project using the
two different outcomes are presented. In 2007 the German economy experienced an
economic boom leading to an improvement of the performance of (nearly) each employ-
ment agency, irrespective of whether it took place in the pilot project or not: compared to
the year before, more unemployed individuals could be integrated in the labour market, the
average duration of unemployment was shortened and accordingly the number of SC-III
unemployed decreased. The main result of this analysis though is, that among the pilot
project offices, the improvement of the performance was even bigger. The following table
lists the estimated ATTs:
Table 2: ATT of the pilot project
pilot project offices control offices
effect before after before after
Y a -0.52*** 3.03 2.01 2.92 2.43
Y b -10.7*** -20.5 -27.1 -21.3 -18.1
The estimated coefficients are based on regression adjustment of Y a and Y b . The results are significant on a 1%-level
Regarding the outcome SC-III unemployment rate (Y a) the result indicates an improvement
of the performance of the pilot project offices: the average SC-III unemployment rate in
April 2008 in the treated group was 2.0% while it was 3.0% in April 2007. According to our
results, 0.5%-points of this difference can be traced back to the pilot project. This effect is
statistically significant and robust towards regression adjustment on the matched sample
(see section 3).
During the period May 2007 until April 2008, the number of SC-III clients (Y b) in the pilot
offices decreased by 27%. Among the controls, we "only" find a decrease in this number of
18%. Regarding the same calendar period during the previous year (May 2006 until April
2007), we do not find any difference between pilot project offices and controls. Thus, the
pilot project offices could decrease the number of clients by around 10% more compared
to the control group. This effect is significantly different from zero. Additionally applying
regression adjustment on the matched sample, the effect slightly increases to 10.7%. 6
5.4 Spill-over effects
In this section we use the neighbour offices of the pilot project offices, i.e. the local em-
ployment offices that are located in an employment agency district where a pilot project
office is located, to assess whether the pilot project induced negative spill-over effects.
Pilot project offices might have improved their performance at the costs of their neighbour
offices as they both operate on the same regional labour market. In order to estimate
potential average spill-over effects, we apply the same matching procedure as described
above but instead of using the pilot project offices as treated, we treat the neighbour offices
as treated.7 What we would expect in case of negative spill-over effects, once using the
6 In addition to the results presented in this paper, we used two indicators of the FEA controlling department
measuring the integration rate and an aggregated unemployment duration as outcome variables. Again, the
estimation indicates a significantly better performance of the treatment group.
7 Note that in this step, we excluded the pilot offices from the pool of potential controls.
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neighbour offices instead of the treated, is negative average treatment effects of these
neighbour offices. The following table contains the results of the spill-over effect analysis:8
Table 3: Spill over effects of the pilot project
neighbour offices control offices
effect before after before after
Y a 0.06 3.26 2.58 3.31 2.67
Y b 0.08 -21.53 -20.86 -21.91 -19.84
The estimated coefficients are based on regression adjustment of Y a and Y b . The results are not significant on a 10%-level
According to the results in table 3 we do not find significant negative spill-over effects:
the increase of the caseload in the pilot project offices did not cause a deterioration of
performance of the neighbour offices.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of a pilot project of the German Federal Employment
Agency, where in 14 local employment offices the caseload was significantly reduced.
As outcome variables we define the SC-III unemployment rate and the growth of SC-III
clients. We rely on a combination of matching and difference-in-differences estimation to
avoid potential selection bias introduced by the non-random assignment of local employ-
ment offices to the treatment group.
Our results indicate a positive effect of a lower caseload on both outcome variables.
However, from the perspective of political decision makers the important question is not
only if the pilot project is successful, but if the same effects could be expected if the
caseload is decreased in all local employment offices. An argument in favour of regional
transferability is that we find no spill-over effects on neighbouring regions. Thus, the
positive effect from the pilot project is not at the expense of other regions. An argument
against a temporal transferability is that the observation period is characterised by an
economic upswing. To what extent our results depend on these favourable economic
conditions further research has to clarify.
8 We used the same covariates and the same matching algorithm as before. After matching there were no
significant differences between the new treatment and control group.
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A Appendix
Table 4: Balance before matching (Minimum P value from T-Tests is 0.016 Minimum P
value from KS-Tests is 0)
mean.Tr mean.Co sdiff.pooled T pval KS pval
Eastern Germany 0.36 0.23 41.59 0.37
Employment growth (local) −0.01 −0.02 40.12 0.13 0.31
Employment growth (region) 0.00 −0.01 99.83 0.03 0.04
Commuting I −0.07 −0.11 26.19 0.27 0.11
Commuting II −0.10 −0.20 49.69 0.08 0.11
Population density 365.19 392.90 −7.18 0.80 0.04
Growth of vacancies (region) 4.11 2.46 29.28 0.50 0.60
Growth of unemployed (local) −0.14 −0.16 22.73 0.67 0.78
Growth of unemployed (region) −0.15 −0.14 −17.22 0.70 0.92
Share SC-II unemployed (region) 0.61 0.61 −1.80 0.95 0.42
SC-III clients 3882.76 2432.91 90.71 0.02 0.00
Share SC-III benefit recipients 0.66 0.66 −5.65 0.83 0.53
Share type “activating” 0.14 0.15 −45.21 0.13 0.27
Share type “advancing” 0.23 0.20 60.29 0.10 0.18
Share type “caring” 0.39 0.39 1.50 0.97 0.17
Share type “market” 0.10 0.09 10.47 0.74 0.63
Share type missing 0.10 0.10 −20.57 0.66 0.67
Share above 50 years 0.41 0.40 28.18 0.36 0.63
Share below 25 years 0.11 0.11 −3.88 0.92 0.99
Share without school degree 0.06 0.06 −7.06 0.84 0.97
Share male 0.48 0.47 52.18 0.08 0.29
Share German 0.93 0.92 9.57 0.77 0.90
Growth above 50 years 0.10 0.10 −5.73 0.84 0.72
Growth above 25 years 0.02 0.03 −10.91 0.72 0.92
Growth without school degree 0.05 −0.02 53.26 0.13 0.29
Growth male −0.06 −0.06 19.02 0.56 0.89
Growth German −0.00 0.00 −39.20 0.24 0.50
Unemployment rate (local) 0.11 0.12 −29.81 0.27 0.61
Unemployment rate (region) 0.11 0.12 −26.71 0.44 0.81
Seasonal indicator 0.01 0.01 −22.74 0.56 0.43
Difference regional and local unemployment rate −0.00 −0.00 −15.81 0.55 0.93
Share training participants 0.22 0.20 63.61 0.17 0.05
Average wage 84.41 82.76 17.13 0.64 0.90
Growth average wage 0.10 0.09 24.43 0.39 0.59
Sanction rate (region) 0.01 0.01 24.29 0.52 0.46
Vacancy rate (region) 0.10 0.09 2.75 0.94 0.61
Integration rate 0.30 0.27 100.15 0.02 0.05
Unemployment duration 182.21 182.58 −2.79 0.91 0.48
Caseload (region) 113.66 121.66 −55.09 0.16 0.26
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Table 5: Balance after 1:1 Matching (Minimum P value from T-Tests is 0.151 Minimum P
value from KS-Tests is 0.26)
mean.Tr mean.Co sdiff.pooled T pval KS pval
Eastern Germany 0.36 0.21 28.73 0.15
Employment growth (local) −0.01 −0.01 −4.74 0.88 1.00
Employment growth (region) 0.00 −0.00 33.39 0.22 0.57
Commuting I −0.07 −0.05 −13.01 0.59 0.84
Commuting II −0.10 −0.07 −13.78 0.53 0.84
Population density 365.19 310.85 13.86 0.37 0.27
Growth of vacancies (region) 4.11 3.87 2.75 0.80 0.99
Growth of unemployed (local) −0.14 −0.15 8.11 0.77 0.85
Growth of unemployed (region) −0.15 −0.14 −13.87 0.55 0.86
Share SC-II unemployed (region) 0.61 0.62 −22.22 0.19 0.88
SC-III clients 3882.76 3600.74 14.52 0.62 0.27
Share SC-III benefit recipients 0.66 0.67 −18.75 0.22 0.53
Share type “activating” 0.14 0.14 −22.28 0.53 0.84
Share type “advancing” 0.23 0.22 14.75 0.59 0.86
Share type “caring” 0.39 0.40 −10.69 0.56 0.27
Share type “market” 0.10 0.09 24.83 0.20 0.26
Share type missing 0.10 0.09 13.94 0.38 0.87
Share above 50 years 0.41 0.40 28.93 0.31 0.27
Share below 25 years 0.11 0.11 3.55 0.90 0.86
Share without school degree 0.06 0.05 19.71 0.44 0.55
Share male 0.48 0.48 23.74 0.25 0.87
Share German 0.93 0.93 −0.90 0.97 0.85
Growth above 50 years 0.10 0.10 −14.01 0.63 0.56
Growth above 25 years 0.02 0.03 −7.09 0.80 1.00
Growth without school degree 0.05 0.02 19.13 0.24 0.54
Growth male −0.06 −0.05 −2.73 0.91 1.00
Growth German −0.00 −0.00 4.98 0.87 0.55
Unemployment rate (local) 0.11 0.11 −9.17 0.55 0.99
Unemployment rate (region) 0.11 0.11 2.82 0.76 0.99
Seasonal indicator 0.01 0.01 15.19 0.45 0.83
Difference regional and local unemployment rate −0.00 0.00 −33.70 0.23 0.50
Share training participants 0.22 0.22 11.77 0.60 0.56
Average wage 84.41 85.76 −10.68 0.61 0.85
Growth average wage 0.10 0.10 −13.63 0.61 0.85
Sanction rate (region) 0.01 0.01 6.85 0.73 0.99
Vacancy rate (region) 0.10 0.09 9.83 0.55 0.87
Integration rate 0.30 0.29 33.84 0.15 0.58
Unemployment duration 182.21 175.91 53.34 0.18 0.50
Caseload (region) 113.66 115.15 −7.59 0.73 0.83
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